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The consequences of introducing or tightening time limits on receiving high unem-
ployment benefits are studied in a shirking model. Stricter time limits have an ambigu-
ous impact on the net wage, and changes of utility levels of employed workers and re-
cipients of high unemployment benefits have the same sign as the variation in the net 
wage. The utility differential between the two groups of unemployed shrinks. The rela-
tive income position of skilled workers moves in the same direction as the net wage of 
unskilled workers. When access to high benefits is denied for caught shirkers, stricter 
time limits may decrease employment.  
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this paper, titled “Time limits on welfare use under involuntary unemployment.   1 Introduction
In many countries, unemployment bene…ts are organized as a two-tier scheme. If a worker
is dismissed, he has access to unemployment insurance bene…ts for an eligibility period
which may depend on individual characteristics. When the time limit is reached, the
unemployed is moved to another program, such as unemployment assistance or social
assistance, and bene…ts are reduced. A similar structure can sometimes be found in
pure welfare schemes. The most prominent example is the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in the United States. It states that, starting from
1996, nobody is eligible for receiving welfare payments based on the federal Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families program for more than …ve years in lifetime and two years
per spell. Should time run out, there is no further access to federal cash bene…ts, but only
to some state-…nanced food stamp program in order to guarantee physical subsistence.
This paper focuses on the impact of introducing time limits on unemployment bene-
…ts on employment, wages, pro…ts, and utility levels of both employed and unemployed
workers. In contrast to the bulk of the empirical literature, which mainly addresses incen-
tives for labor supply (see Blank, 2002, Lalive et al., 2004), a framework with involuntary
unemployment is chosen. The contribution can be seen as complementing earlier analyses
in which the success of welfare reform depends on changes of the behavior of recipients.
If jobs are easily available, the reason for potential increases in employment is straight-
forward. Recipients of unemployment bene…ts will reduce their reservation wages when
faced with a drop in their income. Under involuntary unemployment, labor demand will
respond to changes in the incentive structure of the employed who see unemployment as
a more severe threat now. New job opportunities are created a¤ecting the well-being of
forward-looking welfare recipients. These general equibrium e¤ects may compensate them
for the time limits imposed.
Some evidence that the decline in welfare caseloads is actually driven by labor demand
can be found in the empirical literature. For example, Ziliak et al. (2000) estimate that
1about two thirds of the caseload decline in the Aid for Families With Dependent Children
program observed between 1993 and 1996 is explained by macroeconomic factors repre-
sented, e.g., by lower unemployment rates. Only one third can be attributed to several
regional welfare reforms adopted in various states. Similarly, Arulampalam and Stewart
(1995) …nd for the UK that the e¤ect of unemployment income on the individual hazard
rate to exit from unemployment is substantially lower in periods of high unemployment,
while demand-side factors captured by the local unemployment rate have a strong nega-
tive e¤ect on the exit probability. Hence, an analysis of the e¤ects of a time-limits reform
is needed for a framework in which labor demand plays a decisive role while search e¤ort
is of secondary importance. In the light of our approach, the fall in unemployment in the
U.S. should not be viewed as indicating some exogenous business cycle phenomenon. It
may at least partially be traced back to stricter welfare eligibility rules that enable …rms
to cut wages.
We analyze an e¢ciency wage model where workers may shirk. The two levels of
bene…ts for the unemployed are called unemployment bene…ts and social assistance. As
we are mainly interested in studying the e¤ects of changing time limits, we take the
relevant bene…t levels as given. Both types of bene…ts are …nanced by a proportional
income tax. In the basic model, all individuals are identical with respect to ability and
preferences.
It is shown that imposing a stricter time limit on receiving unemployment bene…ts
increases employment. Since unemployment is made less comfortable, employers can
cut gross wages and raise employment without having to fear that workers lose their
incentive to exert e¤ort. With a smaller number of unemployed, the tax burden tends
to fall. However, since the average duration of unemployment falls with an increasing
employment level, the share of short-term unemployed receiving full bene…ts may go in
either direction. In some special cases the increase in short-term unemployment might be
more costly thanthe decrease inlong-term unemployment and hence lead to an increase in
2overall bene…t payments. Apart from this special case, the tax rate is generally expected
to fall if the time limit is shortened. This enables …rms to lower gross wages even further
and to hire even more workers.
Imposing a stricter time limit will generally raise net pro…ts due to falling gross wages
and a lower tax rate. The impact on net wages is ambiguous. Expected lifetime utility
levels of employed workers and unemployment bene…t recipients will move in the same
direction as net wages. The utility di¤erential between the two groups remains constant
because it is determined by the structure of incentives for employedworkers. Recipients of
unemployment bene…ts are compensated for the risk of losing parts of the welfare bene…t
by improved job opportunities. Those who would be on social assistance anyway may
gain in utility even if the net wage declines because their prospects of getting a job are
improved. Theresult indicates that imposing stricter time limits caneven leadto a Pareto
improvement.
Extending the analysis to a richer skill structure of the workforce, skilled workers
will earn a higher wage and face a lower unemployment rate. We consider a benchmark
scenario in which the two types of workers are perfect substitutes. Although skilled
workers subsidize bene…ts for unskilled workers, the impact on welfare of the two groups
is almost symmetric, andcon…rms the results from thebasic model. The utility di¤erential
between skilled and unskilled workers of a given employment status moves in the same
direction as the net wage of unskilled workers.
Finally, we analyze a variation in which shirkers who are dismissed do not have access
to unemployment bene…ts. As a stricter time limit implies a higher probability for non-
shirkers to lose the high-level unemployment bene…ts and drop down to the lower bene…t
level of social assistance, the value of not shirking in the workplace is reduced. Thus,
tightening the time limit makes shirking more and not less attractive, which tends to
require a higher wage associated with lower employment. At the same time, the smaller
bene…t per unemployed allows a cut in the tax rate which tends to lower the gross wage
3and to increase employment. The overall employment e¤ect is ambiguous. It turns out
that the change in employment is decisive for the impact on utility levels of employed
workers and social assistance recipients. Compared to these two groups, the relative
utility position of short-term unemployed de…nitely deteriorates.
Our contribution is to some extent related to the theory of optimum unemployment
insurance. A basic propositionof this literaturestates that payments shouldstay constant
over time if the unemployed cannot in‡uence their chances of gaining a job. In contrast, if
the re-employment opportunities are determined by unobservable search e¤orts, expected
utility of the bene…ciaries is maximized by a declining bene…t schedule that converges to
zero (Shavell and Weiss, 1979). Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) argue that welfare can be
further increased in such a moral hazard scenario if the personal wage tax increases with
the duration of unemployment. However, Cahuc and Lehmann (2000) showthat declining
unemployment bene…ts may even lead to a higher unemployment rate, since insiders will
drive up their wage demands when expecting a shorter period of unemployment upon
losing their job. Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) demonstrate within an equilibrium
search model that the optimum time limit for receiving the higher bene…t in a two tier
unemployment insurance system is always positive and …nite. The optimum time limit
exceeds zerobecause the searche¤ort ofthose receiving the smaller bene…t increases inthe
duration of the full bene…t. Hassler and Rodriguez Mora (2002) argue that unemployment
bene…ts should even increase over time if the insurer cannot observe consumption and
savings. Individuals then prefer to …nance short spells of unemployment by precautionary
savings. Wang and Williamson (1996, 2002) add job-retention e¤orts of employed workers
as asecond source ofmoralhazard. They derivenon-monotonicoptimum bene…t schedules
and stress that the optimum scheme depends on the worker’s employment history.
Rather than deriving an optimum bene…t schedule, we take as …xed the bene…t levels
in a system withat most two tiers, focusingon the distributional andwelfare consequences
of varying a stochastic time limit. This approach is justi…ed in our analysis of a shirking
4model based on the result that, even with highly risk averse agents, the optimum scheme
may simply consist of a minimum level ofbene…ts, say zero, from the very beginning (Fath
and Fuest, 2005). Nevertheless, it is interesting to look at the distributional consequences
of a labor market reform that changes only the time limit that is relevant for a substantial
reduction in bene…t entitlements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is introduced
in Section 2. Section 3 analyzes problems of existence and stability of equilibria. Com-
parative static results are derived in section 4. Section 5 introduces heterogeneity in
productivity across agents into our basic framework, and section 6 deals with a struc-
ture where shirkers who are dismissed are not entitled to receive unemployment bene…ts.
Section 7 concludes, discusses the …ndings and indicates directions for future research.
2 The basic model
The model is basedon ShapiroandStiglitz (1984). Weconsider N identical workers whose
preferences are described by the utility function U(!;e) = ! ¡ e, where ! denotes the
monetary compensation and e is the e¤ort exerted at the workplace. With probability b
per unit of time, an employment relationship breaks down for exogenous reasons. Workers
are in…nitely lived and maximize W = E
R 1
0 U(!(s);e(s))exp(¡rs)ds; where s denotes
time, r > 0 is the discount rate, and E represents the expectations operator. Employed
workers can either shirk (e = 0) or choose the required e¤ort (e = 1). Workers who
are shirking are detected with probability q per unit of time. Detected shirkers are …red
immediately. All individuals are identical with respect to ability and preferences. We
ignore all issues arising from savings and means tests to qualify for a welfare program.
The unemployed …rst receive an unemployment bene…t w until the time limit is ex-
hausted. The others get w, henceforth called social assistance, where w > w ¸ 0: Inmany
existing two-tier schemes of unemployment compensation, the upper tier is represented
by unemployment insurance bene…ts, while the lower tier is often some welfare program.
5Reinterpreted for an American-style welfare system, the higher bene…t is meant to pro-
vide some minimum level of income above the physical subsistence level, while the lower
bene…t may represent a food-stamp program. Initially, both shirkers and non-shirkers
have access to high unemployment bene…ts. In the basic model we ignore the fact that
in many unemployment compensation schemes access to high bene…ts is denied in some
cases of behavioral misconduct, a point stressed by Atkinson (1995). The bene…ts are
…nanced by a proportional tax on wages and pro…ts, the tax rate being t.
Let V ¾
" ,V ½
" , and Vu denote expected lifetime utility of employed shirkers, employed
non-shirkers, and unemployed individuals receiving the full amount of unemployment
bene…ts, respectively. The asset equations for shirkers and non-shirkers are given by
rV
¾






" = (1¡ t)w ¡ e + b(Vu ¡ V
½
" ) (2)
with w denoting the gross wage.
These asset equations have the structure that the return in a given period is equal to
the ‡ow bene…ts plus the expected change of the value of the asset. An employed worker
will not shirk if V ¾
" · V ½
" ; which is equivalent to
(1¡ t)w ¸ rVu +
r + b+ q
q
e; (3)
the no-shirking condition. If workers were risk averse, a lower wage as the one given in
(3) would be su¢cient to induce e¤ort. Such a modi…cation would, however, not lead to
substantially di¤erent results.
Firms are operating under decreasing returns. Output of the representative …rm is
given by Q = F(L) where L denotes e¤ective labor, i.e. the number of employed work-
ers who are not shirking. The production function satis…es F0(L) > 0;F 00(L) < 0 and
F0(N) > e. The last assumption implies that full employment would be e¢cient.
6An unemployed worker receiving bene…t w will get a job with probability a per unit of
time. Rather than introducing a …xed time limit, the loss of the full bene…t is modeled in
a stochastic fashion. Ina given period, access to regular bene…ts is lost with probability h.
The hazard rate h corresponds to an expected time limit and is seen as a policy variable.
If h = 0, there is no time limit imposed on unemployment bene…ts. The asset equation
of an unemployed worker receiving regular bene…ts is
rVu = w + a(V" ¡ Vu)+ h(Vz ¡ Vu); (4)
where V" = maxfV ¾
" ;V ½
" g; and Vz denotes expected lifetime utility of a social assistance
recipient. We ignore thepossibilities that …rms are reluctant tohire long-term unemployed
or previously detected shirkers. Therefore, the job acquisition rate is independent of the
unemployment status. The asset equation of a welfare recipient reads
rVz = w +a(V" ¡ Vz): (5)
If not shirking is optimal, (2), (4), and(5) can be solved. Combining (4) and (5) yields
(r +h + a)(Vu ¡Vz) = w ¡ w; (6)
and subtracting (4) from (2) leads to
(r + b+a)(V" ¡ Vu) = (1¡ t)w ¡ e¡ w +h(Vu ¡ Vz): (7)
Solving the last two equations for the lifetime utility di¤erentials, it turns out that
V" ¡ Vu =
(1¡ t)w ¡ e ¡
(r + a)w + hw
r + h+ a
r +a + b
; (8)
Vu ¡ Vz =
w ¡ w





r + a + b
[(1¡ t)w ¡ e] +
r + b
r + b+ a
(r + a)w + hw
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Inserting (10) into the no-shirking condition yields
(1¡ t)w ¸




r + h+ a
: (13)
Inducing workers not to shirk requires a higher wage w if either type of bene…ts, w or w,
rises, therate ofexogenous splits b increases, theprobability of …ndinga newjoba goes up,
the tax rate t increases, the rate of time preference r rises, or the quality of monitoring
e¤ort, measured by q, falls. Equations (8) and (13) imply that employed workers will
enjoy a higher expected remaining lifetime utility than those being unemployed at any
given point in time. Thus, unemployment is involuntary. Compared to those receiving
full bene…ts w, employed workers earn the information rent
e
q
. The rent arises due to the
fact that the monitoring technology is imperfect, that is, q is …nite.
In equilibrium, the number of entries into unemployment must be equal to the number
of exits,
a(N ¡ L) = bL: (14)
Similarly, the number of entries into social assistance has to be equal to the number of
exits,
a(N ¡ L¡ U) = hU: (15)
While U individuals receive unemployment bene…ts, N ¡L¡U individuals participate in
the welfare program. Last, the number of entrants into unemployment bene…ts is equal
to the number of leavers,
bL = (a +h)U: (16)
As a = b
L
N ¡ L
, substituting for a from (14) into (13) leads to
(1¡ t)w ¸
(r +q)(N ¡ L)+ bN
q(N ¡ L)
e +
(r(N ¡L) +bL)w + h(N ¡ L)w
(r + h)(N ¡ L)+ bL
: (17)
8Unemployment bene…ts are …nanced through a proportional income tax t on pro…ts
and labour income. The tax base is, therefore, equal to total output F(L), implying that
the government budget equation reads
tF(L) = wU + w(N ¡ L¡ U): (18)
If workers do not shirk, the representative …rm will set its labor input to the point
where the marginal product of labor is equal to the gross wage, that is, where w = F0(L).
Utilizing this relationship and building on (14) and (16), U =
bL(N ¡ L)
bL +h(N ¡ L)
implies
that feasible allocations require
(1¡ t)w = F 0(L)
·
1 ¡






All relevant decisions are taken simultaneously. The government always adjusts the in-
come tax rate instantaneously so as to balance its budget. Firms generally take as given
both the wage and the tax rate and choose employment in order to maximize their pro…ts.
They are willing to accept underbidding by unemployed workers as long as net wages are
higher than necessary to satisfy the no-shirking constraint. Conversely, should the net
wage be too low to prevent workers from shirking, …rms will increase the gross wage.
Taking as given wages, policy variables and the unemployment rate, employed workers
choose whether or not to shirk.
3 Equilibria and stability
An equilibrium is described by a level of employment that satis…es both the no-shirking
condition (17), now with equality, and the feasibility condition (19). The right-hand side






> 0 at L = 0. It
increases in L and tends to in…nity if L ! N. Note that the right-hand side of the
feasibility condition (19) will be equal to F0(N) > 0 if L = N. Moreover, provided that
9F(0) = 0, an employment level L0 2 (0;N) exists which satis…es
·
1¡
bLw + h(N ¡ L)w





Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium conditions. The no-shirking condition holds on
and above the NSC curve, while the feasibility curve G represents the budget constraint
of the government combined with the marginal productivity rule of pay. If the two curves
intersect, and if we neglect the possibility of a tangent point, at least two equilibria exist.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Rewriting (17) (with equality) and (19) shows that an equilibrium has to satisfy








(r (N ¡ L) +bL)w +h(N ¡ L)w
(r + h)(N ¡ L)+ bL
;




bLw +h(N ¡ L)w





where f1 = f2 = 0: The dynamic evolutionof thetwokey variables is givenby _ [(1 ¡ t)w] =
©1(f1((1 ¡ t)w;L)) and _ L = ©2(f2((1¡ t)w;L)) with ©1(0) = ©2(0) = 0; ©0
1 < 0; and
©0
2 < 0. The …rst di¤erential equation expresses that wages will be cut if the no-shirking
10constraint is not binding, while there is a wage increase when the no-shirking condition
is not satis…ed. The second equation of motion implies that employment will be reduced
if the gross wage exceeds the marginal product of labor, and vice versa. For a locally
stable equilibrium, it is necessary that the determinant of the Jacobian of the system of
di¤erential equations is non-negative at the equilibrium, and that its trace is non-positive.











< 0. The former
condition requires that the NSC curve cuts the G curve from below.
In Figure 1, the equilibrium at the employment level L1 is a saddle point, andtherefore
unstable. If a point on the G curve between L1 and L2 is realized, the …rm is willing to
accept underbidding by unemployed workers. As a consequence, employment will increase
and the gross wage rate will fall. Underbidding will no longer be accepted at L2 since the
no-shirking condition would then be violated. The equilibrium at L2 is always a locally
stable focus if the G curve is downward sloping at this point. It is still a locally stable
focus with an upward sloping G curve if the condition on the trace is met.
4 Changing the bene…t loss rate
Proposition 1 summarizes the e¤ects of an increasing risk of losing the full unemployment
bene…t and having to rely on social assistance.
Proposition 1 Employment L increases and the gross wage w decreases with a higher
bene…t loss rate (that is, a tighter time limit) h. The lifetime utility di¤erential between
employed workers and short-term unemployed, V" ¡ Vu, remains constant. The lifetime
utility di¤erential between unemployment bene…t recipients and social assistance recipi-
ents, Vu ¡ Vz, shrinks. Lifetime utility levels of employed workers and short-term unem-
ployed move in the same direction as the net wage.
Proof. See Appendix A. ¤
11The comparative statics can be interpreted as follows. A higher bene…t loss rate is
equivalent to a stricter time limit of receiving unemployment bene…ts. As a consequence,
the threat of unemployment becomes more severe. The minimum wage needed to induce
e¤ort at the workplace decreases, which corresponds to a downward shift of the NSC
curve. Due to a higher share of food stamp recipients at a given level of unemployment,
the tax burden decreases. The feasibility curve G shifts upwards for any positive un-
employment level. Any given gross wage now corresponds to a higher net wage. The
tax reduction thus represents a second channel allowing to cut gross wages and increase
employment.
The unemployed are a¤ected by the loss in expected bene…ts. At the same time, their
job opportunities are becoming better. Moreover, their net wage changes once they re-
enter employment. For employed workers, the threat of becoming unemployed is more
serious now due to a stricter time limit for receiving the full bene…t. At the same time,
the increasing opportunities of regaining employment work in the opposite direction. In
any case, employed workers are also confronted with a variation in their net wage. The
lifetime utility di¤erential between employed workers and those receiving unemployment
bene…ts remains unchanged. This result holds because the no-shirking condition implies
that the utility di¤erential is exclusively determined by the level of e¤ort exerted at the
workplace and the quality of the detection technology. The net impact on per-period
utility for each of these groups is determined by the variation in net wages. By contrast,
the impact of the stricter time limit on social assistance recipients is more likely to be
positive. As it takes two transitions, into andoutof employment, before the timelimit can
bite, current social assistance recipients are least a¤ected by a tighter time limit. They
bene…t from better opportunities to leave unemployment and, as forward-looking agents,
also take into account the change in net wages. In terms of absolute utility di¤erentials,
their utility position compared to the other two groups of workers improves.
12Tedius computations provided in Appendix B show the response of the equilibrium
tax rate to a rising bene…t loss rate. The outcome is not obvious because the fall in un-
employment will be associated with a smaller share of social assistance recipients among
the unemployed. While being quite an implausible scenario, an increase in total unem-
ployment bene…ts via a rising number of recipients of high-level bene…ts cannot be ruled
out. It can be demonstrated that the equilibrium tax rate is going to fall if either the
discount rate or the bene…t loss rate are su¢ciently small. Therefore, we will ignore the
possibility of a perverse tax reaction in the following.
Firms take advantage of the lower gross wage and the lower tax rate. Their net pro…ts




















is ambiguous in general and mainly depends on the properties of the production function
and the level of unemployment bene…ts. If the marginal product of labor responds to
a higher labor input in an unelastic fashion, the tax reduction dominates the reduction
in gross wages, implying a rise in net wages. Conversely, if the change in the marginal
product of labor is stronger, while unemployment bene…ts are relatively small, the overall
e¤ect will go in the opposite direction.
Interestingly, the share of social assistance recipients among the unemployed does
not necessarily increase. According to equation (15), the ratio between individuals with
regular bene…ts and social assistance recipients is equal to
U





stricter time limit (higher h) directly induces a higher share of welfare recipients, the
resulting increase in the employment level is associated with a rising job acquisition rate
a. The latter e¤ect reduces the number and the share of those living on social assistance.






13unity, a smaller share of welfare recipients among the unemployed will be the result. This
is illustrated by an example presented in Appendix C.
Should net wages fall, it may still be the case that introducing time limits wins a
political majority. First, the residual income, which can be interpreted as capital income,
increases. Provided that there is a su¢ciently even distribution of wealth, losses in work-
ers’ expected utility may be o¤set by gains in capital income. Second, workers may take
into account that there is a higher probability to be among the employed under the new
framework. A worker taking decisions behind a veil of ignorance – that is, not knowing
the realization of his employment status – may therefore opt for the stricter time limit
even if this is associated with a utility reduction under all possible employment states.
In fact, the higher total production outweighs the additional e¤ort of the workers. With
risk-neutral agents deciding under a veil of ignorance, this property e¤ectively calls for
abolishing unemployment bene…ts. At the same time, however, the probability of being
faced with the least fortunate state of a social assistance recipient will often increase. If
workers are risk averse, it is thus conceivable that a utilitarian government will not simply
set the time limit tozero. On the other hand, FathandFuest (2005) argue that the impact
on the incentives for the employed could be so strong that abolishing all unemployment
bene…ts will still be optimal if agents are extremely risk averse.
With the veil of ignorance removed, the outcome can be reversed. A Pareto im-
provement may even not be achieved by taxing capital on a lump-sum basis and equally
redistributing the proceeds among the workers. Note that this type of redistribution
would not a¤ect incentives in the model. Yet, as the share of workers enjoying the highest
utility level increases, capital owners and both employed and unemployed workers may
lose after redistribution has taken place in such a setting.
145 Heterogeneous labor
Introducing heterogeneous types of labor represents an extension of the model that is
potentially useful to shed more light on the distributional implications of tightening eli-
gibility rules for welfare recipients. In particular, skilled workers will typically subsidize
unskilled workers through the unemployment compensation system. Due to the higher
productivity of skilled workers, the shirking model implies that their unemployment rate
is smaller than the unemployment rate of unskilled workers. Further, at a given propor-
tional tax rate, the higher wage per worker is re‡ected in higher tax payments. A fall in
unemployment reduces the subsidy per employed skilled worker in favor of the unskilled
unemployed. Another e¤ect arises if skilled and unskilled labor are complements in pro-
duction. In this case, any reduction in unemployment of one type of labor raises the
productivity of the other type of labor, implying a positive impact on the welfare of the
other group.
Assume now that …rms use skilled labor S and unskilled labor L as inputs in produc-
tion. Part of the skilled labor force M as well as the stock of unskilled labor N remain
unemployed in order to preserve the incentives to deliver e¤ort at the workplace.
We restrict our attention to a benchmark scenario in which skilled and unskilled labor
are perfect substitutes. One unit of skilled labor equals ® > 1 e¢ciency units of unskilled
labor. The production function can be written as F(L + ®S) with F0 > 0 and F 00 < 0.
The gross wage of skilled workers is given by ws = ®w with w denoting the gross wage
of unskilled workers. Let eligibility rules for bene…ts, the monitoring technology, and the
exogenous separation rate be independent of quali…cation.




conditions for unskilled and skilled workers are given by (17) and















respectively. At any given net wage (1¡t)w, the two inequalities determine the maximum
15employment that induces workers not to shirk.
The feasibility condition now reads





















where US is the number of skilled social assistance recipients. At given employment levels
(S;L), equation (25) determines the gross wage w that satis…es the input rule and the
tax rate t that balances the government’s budget.
Any equilibrium ((1¡ t)w;S;L) is determined by the three equations




















































with g1 = g2 = g3 = 0.
We restrict our attention to interior solutions where both skilled and unskilled work-
ers will be employed. Then, the two no-shirking conditions (26) and (27) immediately
imply that u > µ, that is, the unemployment rate among skilled workers will be smaller
than the corresponding rate of unskilled workers. This result is easily understood. The
wage di¤erential between skilled and unskilled workers re‡ects di¤erences in their pro-
ductivities. Since unemployment bene…ts are independent of quali…cation, a smaller level
16of equilibrium unemployment is su¢cient to restore work incentives for skilled workers.
With a varying net wage, equations (26)and (27) also imply that changes ingroup-speci…c
unemployment rates will always move in the same direction.
It can easily be checked that all the results stated in Proposition 1 regarding the
impact of changes in the bene…t loss rate on employment, wages, utility levels and utility
di¤erentials within each skill group can be replicated here. Hence, a higher bene…t loss
rate will lead to a reduction in unemployment for each skill group and a fall in gross
wages. For each skill group, the lifetime utility di¤erential between employed workers
and short-term unemployed remains constant, whereas the utility di¤erential beween the
short-term unemployed and the long-term unemployed is shrinking. All utility levels of
employed workers and short-term unemployed move in the same direction as the net wage
of the unskilled. Proposition 2 summarizes the distributional e¤ects across skill groups
of an increasing risk of losing the full unemployment bene…t and having to rely on social
assistance.
Proposition 2 With a higher bene…t lossrate (that is, a tighter time limit)h, the lifetime
utility di¤erential between skilled employed workers and unskilled employed workers, V S
" ¡
V", moves in the same direction as the net wage of unskilled workers. The same holds for
the lifetime utility di¤erential between skilled and unskilled recipients of unemployment
bene…ts, V S
u ¡ Vu. Lifetime utility levels of employed workers and unemployment bene…t
recipients move in the same direction as the net wage.
Proof. See Appendix D. ¤
Proposition 2 states that increasing the bene…t loss rate will generally have distrib-
utional consequences across skill groups. Both skilled and unskilled workers will bene…t
from lower unemployment, and both groups experience a falling gross wage. The re-
duction of the unemployment rate for the unskilled will typically exceed the one for the
skilled workers. On the other hand, the subsidies that skilled workers have to pay to the
unskilled via the unemployment compensation scheme will go down.
17It turns out that the change in the net wage is crucial for determining the relative
winners and losers. If the net wage falls, the utility di¤erential between skilled and
unskilled workers in a given employment status is shrinking. Conversely, an increasing
net wage is associated with an increasing skill premium in terms of higher lifetime uility.
6 Restricted bene…t access for shirkers
Let us …nally consider an environment in which shirkers cannot claim high bene…ts. In
fact, immediate access to unemployment insurance bene…ts is in many countries deniedfor
workerswho quit voluntarily or who aredismisseddue toindustrial misconduct (Atkinson,
1995). In this section, taking these rulings as given and enforceable, we modify our model
as follows. Dismissed shirkers do not have access to high unemployment bene…ts, but
will immediately receive social assistance. By contrast, those who quit their jobs due




" = (1 ¡ t)w + b(Vu ¡ V
¾
" )+ q(Vz ¡ V
¾
" ): (29)
With this alternative rule, the no-shirking condition changes to
(1 ¡ t)w ¸
r +b +q
q
e + rVz ¡ b(Vu ¡ Vz): (30)
Hence, the minimum net wage necessary to induce e¤ort at the workplace increases with a
higher level of the value attached to receiving social assistance andfalls withan increasing
utility di¤erential betweenthe two states of being unemployed. While the former property
is quite intuitive and parallel to the basic model, the latter needs some explanation.
Although hazard rates of exogenous separation are identical for shirkers and non-shirkers,
there is a higher probability of being in the state of receiving high bene…ts for non-shirkers
after some short (…nite) period of time. Therefore, a higher utility di¤erential between
the two states of unemployment discourages shirking.
18The other asset equations are not a¤ected by the modi…ed treatment of shirkers,
implying that equations (8) and (9) still represent the utility di¤erentials V" ¡ Vu and
Vu¡Vz. However, as can easily be shown by comparingthe asset equations of shirkers and
non-shirkers, if the no-shirking condition is satis…ed with equality, the utility di¤erential
between employed workers and social assistance recipients is now …xed,




Inserting the solutions of the utility di¤erentials, starting from
(1 ¡ t)w ¡ e ¡
(r +a)w + hw
r + h +a
r + a +b
+
w ¡ w





the no-shirking condition can be rewritten as
(1¡ t)w ¸
r + a +b +q
q
e ¡
bw ¡ (r + a + b+h)w
r + h+ a
: (33)
Using the conditions on ‡ow equilibria, this leads to the aggregate no-shirking condition,
(1¡ t)w ¸
(r +q)(N ¡ L) +bN
q(N ¡ L)
e ¡
[bw ¡ (r + h)w](N ¡ L) ¡bNw
(r + h)(N ¡ L) + bL
: (34)
At the same time, there is no change of the feasibility equation. Thus the equilibrium
vector of ((1¡ t)w;L) is determined by the equations (19) and (34).
The results regarding the impact of changes in the bene…t loss rate h on utility levels
and di¤erentials are summarized in Proposition 3:
Proposition 3 With a higher bene…t lossrate (that is, a tighter time limit)h, the lifetime
utility di¤erential between employed workers and social assistance recipients, V" ¡Vz, re-
mains unchanged. The respective utility levels move in the same direction as employment.
The lifetime utility di¤erential between the two groups of unemployed, Vu¡ Vz; shrinks if
@a
@h
> ¡1, that is, if employment does not decrease too much.
19Proof. See Appendix E. ¤
A variation in the bene…t loss rate has no impact on the utility di¤erential between
employed workers and social assistance recipients, as this depends only on the e¤ort ex-
erted at the workplace and the shirking detection rate. Given the …xed utility di¤erential,
the change in lifetime utility of social assistance recipients is exclusively determined by
the impact on employment opportunities. Those living on unemployment bene…ts are
a¤ected by the impact on the job acquisition rate in a similar fashion. In addition, they
su¤er from the expectation of losing their bene…ts earlier. Hence, it is unsurprising that
unemployment bene…t recipients tend to be the losers of the reform in terms of utility
di¤erentials.
Comparative static results can be derived in the usual way. Rewriting the equilibrium
conditions (34), with equality, and (19) as





q (N ¡ L)
e (35)
+
[bw ¡ (r + h)w](N ¡ L) ¡ bNw
(r + h)(N ¡ L)+ bL
= 0;
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= sgn['2h'1L ¡'1h'2L] (38)
according to the implicit function theorem.
Evaluating (37) yields
'1h ¡ '2h = ¡
b(N ¡ L)
2(w ¡ w)
[(r + h)(N ¡ L)+ bL]
2 +
F 0(L)(N ¡ L)
F(L)
bL(N ¡ L)(w ¡ w)
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20As the wage share
F0(L)L
F(L)
< 1 can be arbitrarily close to unity and the interest rate r




Further, it turns out that
'2h'1L ¡ '1h'2L = ¡
F0(L)(N ¡ L)
F(L)
bL(N ¡ L)(w ¡ w)
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This term is positive provided that
@t
@L
is not too negative.
Increasing the bene…t loss rate in the modi…ed model raises the incentives to shirk,
as the utility di¤erential between the two states of unemployment is shrinking. Thus,
the no-shirking curve shifts upwards. This e¤ect tends to decrease employment. Taken
in isolation, the net wage will fall if the feasibility curve is upward sloping at the stable
equilibrium, and it will rise if the feasibility curve is downward sloping there. At the same
time, with a smaller cost per unemployed worker, the feasibility curve shifts upwards. As
more people can be pro…tably employed at a given net wage, this e¤ect tends to increase
employment and also the net wage. Clearly, employment can move in either direction.
The net wage will always rise if unemployment does not increase.
7 Concluding discussion
The main message of this paper is that changes in the net wage are of particular impor-
tance when evaluating the welfare consequences of introducing or tightening time limits in
unemployment bene…t or welfare systems. Lifetime utilities of employed and short-term
unemployed workers move in the same direction as the net wage, while the long-term
21unemployed may gain in expected lifetime utility even if their prospective net wage falls.
Although unemployment is generally reduced, the structure of unemployment may in
extreme cases evolve in an unexpected fashion. In itself, the stricter time limit induces
a reduction in the share of those recieving full bene…ts. At the same time, the rising
number of jobs reduces the average duration of unemployment, such that the resulting
higher share of short-term unemployed could o¤set the direct e¤ect of the stricter time
limit.
Evaluating the overall welfare consequences of introducing or tightening time limits on
bene…t receipt remains di¢cult due to the distributional implications. While the expected
increase in total output involves the potential for a Pareto improvement, a higher share
of low bene…t recipients is certain when the time limit is introduced, and it will often
turn out when the time limit is tightened. On the other hand, our analysis indicates
that recipients of low bene…ts are the winners of the reform in terms of changes in utility
di¤erentials when compared to other types of workers.
Allowing for a heterogeneous workforce does not change the results substantially. It is
still true that changes in net wages drive the e¤ects for utility levels of employed workers
and short-term unemployed. The skill premium interms of utility is anincreasing function
of the net wage of unskilled workers. This last result will presumably no longer hold if the
di¤erent types of labor are complements rather than substitutes. As the ratio of unskilled
workers to skilled workers is expected to go up when the time limit is tightened, the skill
premium will probably rise.
The consequences of stricter time limits are completely di¤erent if legal rules are ac-
tually enforced that deny access for dismissed shirkers to the more generous tier of the
unemployment compensation scheme. In this case, stricter time limits increase the incen-
tive to shirk because the reform hurts non-shirkers more than shirkers. The reason is that
the unemployed who are not dismissed because of shirking receive unemployment bene…ts
for a shorter period of time. Employment gains may still arise due to the falling cost of an
22unemployed at a given level of total employment. It turns out that the change in employ-
ment is crucial for assessing the gains of employed workers and long-term unemployed.
The short-term unemployed tend to be the losers of stricter time limits.
Obviously, a possible extension of our analysis would be to investigate the structure of
an optimal unemployment scheme in a framework with risk averse agents, where both the
bene…t levels and the bene…t loss rate can be chosen. However, as Fath and Fuest (2005)
have shown, repercussions on the incentive structure of the employed that ariseinshirking
models will generally imply that there is no demand at all for unemployment insurance.
Hence, even with strong risk aversion the optimum level of bene…ts will typically be equal
to zero.
23Appendix
A: Proof of Proposition 1






, where ¢ is the determinant of the Jacobian of (20) and (21), and ¢xh









. Taking into account the su¢cient stability condition ¢ >






= ¡sgn[¢xh]: Evaluating the derivatives reveals that
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2 < 0: (44)
Since
@ [V" ¡ Vu]
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B: Impact on the tax rate
Calculating the impact of a higher bene…t loss rate on the tax rate from equation (19),
and taking into account (14), yields
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@h























24The …rst term on the right-hand side re‡ects the smaller expenditure level due to the
higher share of social assistance recipients at a given unemployment rate. The second
term mirrors the shift in the structure of unemployment towards a higher share of those
receiving unemployment bene…ts with a fall in total unemployment. Finally, the third
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< 0 if either the discount rate r or the bene…t loss rate h is su¢ciently
close to zero:
C: Example with falling share of social assistance recipients
Assume a production function with diminishing marginal returns pL® + 3L with the
parameter values p = 10000 and ® = :001, a population of N = 1;000, an interest rate of
r = :04, a required e¤ort of e = :1, a separation rate of b = :01, a detection probability
of q = :9, unemployment bene…ts of w = 1 and social assistance bene…ts of w = :1. In
Table 1, we compute the stable employment level and the ratio of unemployment bene…t
recipients to social assistance recipients for di¤erent levels of the bene…t loss rate h.
26h L a=h
1 250:61 3:3442£ 10¡3
0:8 211:23 3:3475£ 10¡3
0:6 166:57 3:3310£ 10¡3
0:4 117:50 3:3286£ 10¡3
0:2 65:267 3:4912£ 10¡3
Table 1. Impact on the structure of
unemployment bene…t recipients.
It turns out that the share of regular social assistance recipients falls when the bene…t
loss rate is increased from .2 to .4. The opposite reaction occurs when the rate is further
increased from .4 to .8.
D: Proof of Proposition 2
Note that the no-shirking constraint for skilled workers is







u denotes lifetime utility of a skilled social assistance recipient. Taking the no-
shirking constraints to hold with equality and subtracting (3) from (45) yields
(1¡ t)w(® ¡ 1) = r(V
S
u ¡ Vu): (46)
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27E: Proof of Proposition 3
It is immediate from equation (31) that
@[V" ¡ Vz]
@h
















. Finally, (9) shows that
@a
@h
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